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Proper scoring rules (PSRs) have been derived to elicit good probability 
assessments. Because there are so many different kinds of PSRs, this experi- 
merit was designed to determine if any particular characteristics contribute 
to effectiveness. Subjects observed poker chips in jars and bet on the color 
of the chip to be sampled. On different trials, lists of bets were generated 
by different PSRs. The type (log, quadratic, or spherical) of PSR used 
appeared to have essentially no effect on the probability inferred from the 
bet selected. However, the inferred probability became less extreme with in- 
creased steepness in the functions relating score to assessed probability. Also, 
various suboptimal strategies seemed to be employed when the rule contained 
both positive and negative scores, so all possible scores should probably be 
either positive or negative but not both. 
There are many uncertain events in the world, and often people evalu- 
ate the degree of uncertainty in their own minds about an event by 
stating a probability. The practice of attaching probabilities to uncertain 
events is well known in the field of meteorology, where we are told, for 
example, that  the "chance of rain tomorrow is 30%," but probabilistie 
assessments are also used in such diverse fields as business, medicine, 
intelligence, and psyehology, not to mention the world of gambling. 
Many  investigators have broached the problem of assessing a person's 
subjective probability distribution (SPD) over an event space so that  it 
is not hedged one way or another (e.g., Savage, 1971; Murphy & Epstein, 
1967; Winkler, 1967; Winkler & Murphy,  1968a). For example, a weather 
forecaster may believe, after examining all available data, that  the prob- 
ability of rain tomorrow is .50, yet  if he is biased in favor of predicting 
rain (perhaps because farmers need it), he may forecast .70 as the 
probability of rain. 
1The research reported here was undertaken in the Engineering Psychology 
Laboratory, Institute of Science and Technology, University of Michigan. The 
research was supported by the Wood Kalb Foundation. 
2 Requests for reprints should be sent to Cameron P~. Peterson, Engineering 
Psychology Laboratory, Highway Safety Research Institute, Institute of Science and 
Technology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48105. 
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A class of payoff functions known as proper scoring rules has been 
considered as one approach to encourage probabili ty assessors to state 
their true beliefs. In general a scoring rule is any algorithm that  assigns 
a payoff for a probabil i ty assessment, where the payoff depends only on 
the assessor's stated probabili ty distribution and the event that  
actually occurs. A proper scoring rule (PSR) is a payoff function 
whereby a person can maximize his subjectively expected score only by 
stating his true beliefs. Letting p = ( p l ,  P 2 ,  • • • , p n )  represent a per- 
son's SPD over n mutual ly exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses and 
r = (rl, r~, . . . , rn) his stated (assessed) distribution, under a PSR he 
can maximize his subjectively expected score by setting r = p. 
The three most common "types"  of PSRs are the logarithmic, the 
quadratic, and the spherical. Letting Sk(r) denote the score which ob- 
tains if the kth event occurs, the three rules may  be stated mathe- 
matically as follows: 
logarithmic: Sk(r) = log rk 
quadratic: Sk(r) = 2rk - ~ ri 2 
i ~ 1  
spherical: Sk(r) = rk ri2 1/2 
\ i = 1  
I t  has been demonstrated elsewhere (e.g., Winkler & Murphy,  1968b) 
tha t  the above three rules are indeed proper. 
Any PSR remains proper through a linear transformation, provided 
the multiplicative constant is positive (Toda, 1963). Thus, it is possible 
to generate an infinite number of different PSRs of any one type, and 
these three are by no means the only types. 
Which of the infinite number of PSRs should one use? On purely theo- 
retical grounds it should make no difference. The rationale behind the 
use of PSRs is that  a person should evaluate his subjectively expected 
value (SEV) function for the different probabilities he can assess, and 
then state the probabili ty which maximizes that  function. Therefore 
every proper scoring rule should have the same effect; the person should 
state r = p in order to maximize SEV. 
However, different scoring rules may  have different psychological 
effects. For  example, the "sens i t iv i ty"  or penalty for hedging assigned 
by the logarithmic, quadratic, and spherical PSR has been investigated 
by Murphy and Winkler (1970b). I t  turns out that  the SEV functions 
tend to be comparatively flat in the regions of their maxima, so that  a 
person is penalized relatively little in terms oI SEV for deviating sub- 
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stantially from stating his true SPD. Thus, it would seem that stated 
probabilities could be pushed around by a variety of factors, even when 
a PSR is used. The problem of the "flat maximum" can be accentuated 
or lessened through multiplicative transformations of any of the PSRs. 
Such a transformation merely changes the range of possible scores, but 
such changes can make the SEV function almost perfectly flat or rela- 
tively steep, depending on the multiplicative constant. 
Beside3 multiplication by a constant, one can also perform a linear 
transformation on any of the PSRs by adding or subtracting a constant 
from every score. For example, it could be arranged so that all scores 
would be positive outcomes (which requires truncation with the log rule), 
negative outcomes, or a mixture of the two. It  may be that both additive 
and multiplicative manipulations have psychological consequences on 
probability statements. 
It may also be that the characteristic shape of each type of PSR has 
an effect on assessments. For example, the logarithmic rule is very steep 
close to r~ = 0 and flattens out as r~ increases, becoming ahnost linear 
between r~. = .5 and rk = 1.0. The quadratic rule, as the name implies, 
always has a parabolic shape, while the spherical rule has a very slight 
S shape, being almost horizontal near rl~ = 1.0. Arguments have been 
made on both theoretical (Raiffa, 1969; Winkler, 1969) and empirical 
(Phillips & Edwards, 1966) grounds that the logarithmic scoring rule is 
superior to the others. Meteorologists, on the other hand, seem to favor 
the quadratic rule, at least in practice. Murphy and Winkler (1970b) 
have considered in detail the relative merits of different. PSRs. 
Because of the increasing use of PSRs, it is becoming important to 
investigate the differential psychological effects Of using different scoring 
rules. This is the problem addressed by the present experiment. Spe- 
cifically, what is the psychological effect of varying the type or trans- 
formation of a PSR? 
METHOD 
Experimental Design 
In most practical situations the assessor's subjective probability for an 
event is not. known, so it is difficult to know whether his stated proba- 
bility is his "best" estimate. In the present experiment, however, there 
was not as much interest in what the subjective probabilities were as in 
evaluating how Ss would react to different kinds of PSP~s. Therefore, the 
correct probabilities were displayed as transparently as possible and Ss 
were given extensive experience in dealing with these probabilities so that 
it was reasonable to assume that their subjective probabilities would 
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conform to the correct or "public" probabilities. The Ss were not asked to 
state r but rather they were asked to focus on the payoffs generated by 
the PSR and select the set of payoffs they considered most desirable. 
This was accomplished by having the Ss select one bet from a list of bets 
for each PSR. Values of r were inferred from their choices of bets. Dif- 
ferences in inferred rs resulting from different scoring rules provided a 
means of measuring biases attributable to different PSRs. In this experi- 
ment we consider only the case of two possible events. The S can be 
thought of as making only a single probability assessment, e.g., the 
probability of the favored hypothesis; we shall call that assessment rj. 
Additivity of probabilities determines the other value. Two binomial 
populations were used, one with proportions .60 and .40, the other with 
proportions .85 and .15, in order to test PSRs under two levels of objec- 
tire probabilities. 
For each of the two populations each of the three types of PSRs was 
used to generate two lists of 50 bets each in which the inferred probabili- 
ties for rj ranged from .05 to .98. Scale constants for the functions gen- 
erating each list were determined by the following set of criteria: first, 
the EV for estimating the probabilities correctly was set at 50 points. 
Thus, every EV function passed through the same maximum point for 
each population. Second, for each PSR two conditions were created: 
under the Flat condition, an estimate of rs of .05 would yield a score of 
- 2 0  points if the other event occurred; in the Peaked condition an ri 
of .05 would yield a score of - 160 points if the other event occurred. 
The above constraints had two major effects. First, they forced dif- 
ferent types (log, quadratic, and spherical) of PSRs to be similar in 
steepness. Second, these scale transforms forced two versions of each 
type of PSR to be strikingly different from each other in steepness. As 
the labels imply, under the Flat condition the EV function was much 
flatter than under the Peaked condition. 
As a control condition, to insure that Ss were paying attention to the 
task, linear scoring rules were used to generate lists of bets for each of 
the conditions described above. The optimal strategy under a linear scot- 
ing rule is to estimate r i = 1.0, because that will maximize SEV. Previous 
research (e.g., Phillips & Edwards, 1966) has demonstrated that linear 
scoring rules elicit more extreme rj than do PSRs. Scale constants for the 
linear rules were determined by the same criteria as for the PSRs. 
The resulting scoring rules are displayed in Fig. 1. In addition to these 
scoring rules, two additional PSRs were created by either adding or sub- 
tracting 50 points from every bet in the "flat" logarithmic list for the 
60-40 population. This preserved the properness of the rules while per- 
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Fro. 1. Scores under various scoring rules as a function of r1~, the estimated 
probability for the event that occurs. (Solid lines refer to the Flab condition; dashed 
lines refer to the Peaked condition. The upper graphs are for the 6040 population; 
the lower graphs are for the 85-15 population.) 
mitring a comparison of three PSRs which were identical in form, dif- 
fering only in overall EV. 
P r o c e d u r e  
The first par t  of the experimental session was played for practice, and 
in the second par t  the bets were played for real, i.e., for money. Subjects 
were run individual]y and received no specific training in the use of any 
strategy, in fact, they were encouraged to experiment with different 
strategies during practice. At the beginning of the experiment each S 
was shown a large, t ransparent  glass jar  filled with poker chips of two 
colors, representing either the 6 0 4 0  or the 85-15 population (the 60-40 
population consisted of 60% blue chips and 40% red chips and the 85-15 
popu]ation consisted of 85% white chips and 15% red chips). The 8 did 
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not know the proportions beforehand. After careful visual examination 
of one population, S was asked to estimate the proportions of that popu- 
lation, following which he was told what the true proportions were. Those 
proportions were thereafter displayed on cards in percentage form to 
remind Ss of the correct proportions. 
The E then emptied that jar into a bookbag, and practice commenced. 
The lists of bets for that population were arranged in random order in a 
booklet, one list to a page. From each list S chose the bet he most 
wanted to play and indicated his choice verbally to E. After each choice 
the bet was played; play consisting of having S draw a poker chip from 
the bookbag. The color of the chip determined S's winnings for that bet. 
This process was repeated until all bets for that population had been 
played. Then the S followed the same procedure for the other population. 
Half of the Ss started with the 60-40 population and half started with 
the 85-15 population. The practice part of the experiment was intended 
to give Ss familiarity with the procedure, with the proportions involved, 
and with the sample outcomes of the bets they chose. The E kept track 
of winnings for the practice session and at the conclusion of practice told 
S the total, the exchange rate from points to money (1 point = .1 cent), 
and how much S would have won had the practice bets been played for 
real. Then the real session started, proceeding in the same manner as the 
practice session with two exceptions: For each S the order of presenta- 
tion of lists for each population was randomized; and S made his choices 
by marking his preferred bet in the booklet. At the conclusion of the 
experiment S was asked to respond in writing to two questions: (a) 
"What did you think the experiment was about?" and (b) "If  you used 
any kind of strategy in choosing your bets, what was it?" 
Subjects 
TwenW-two men students from The University of Michigan served 
as Ss. A S's pay was determined by the outcomes of the 18 bets played 
during the l-hr experiment; possible earnings ranged from -$1.05 to 
$2.54. Actual earnings ranged from $.94 to $1.90 with a mean of $1.54. 
RESULTS 
Subjects' verbal estimates of the proportions for the two populations 
indicated that they had good intuitive understanding of the proportions 
involved. For the 60-40 population the mean estimate of the proportion 
of the predominant color was .61 (SD = .07). For the 85-15 population 
the mean estimate of the proportion of the predominant color was .83 
(SD = .08). 
Figure 2 displays the results of individual Ss in conjunction with ex- 
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FI~. 2. Distribution of Ss' inferred probability estimates for the more likely 
hypothesis (rD, plotted on SEV functions derived from the scoring rules in Ffg. 1. 
(Points above the curve are for the Flat conditions; points below the curve are 
for the Peaked condition.) 
pec.ted value functions corresponding to the scoring rules displayed in 
Fig. 1. The expected value functions are related to the scoring rule func- 
tions by the formula EV = p ~ ( r )  + pbSb(r), where a and 5 refer to the 
two possible events. Observe that  manipulation of the multiplicative con- 
stant produced substantial differences in steepness of the EV functions 
between the flat and the peaked conditions. The Ss' inferred probability 
assessments, rj, were calculated by using the respective scoring rules. 
Those inferred values are plotted to show the distribution of responses 
across possible values of rj. Points above the curves refer to the flat 
condition; points below refer to the peakedcondition. 
I t  is obvious that  Ss' responses to linear scoring rules were substan- 
tially more extreme than their responses to PSRs; this difference is sta- 
tistically significant at the .05 level as measured by t tests. This result 
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reproduces previous findings (e.g., Phillips & Edwards, 1966) and indi- 
cates that  Ss were attending to the task, i.e., tha t  PSRs did have some 
influence on their responses. A summary of mean inferred probabili ty 
assessments for most of the scoring rules tested is given in Table 1. 
I t  is clear that  Ss responded more extremely to the 85-15 populations. 
However, for the 60-40 population both the mean flat estimate for PSRs 
(.76) and the mean peaked estimate (.65) overshot the correct proba- 
bility, whereas for the 85.-15 population the mean flat estimate (.86) 
was very close to optimal, but the mean peaked estimate (.75) undershot 
the correct probabili ty considerably .  
With respect to differences between types of PSRs, Figure 2 indicates 
that  under the sets of scale constraints considered, there were essentially 
no differences between mean inferred assessments between any of the 
types of PSRs. This conclusion was again confirmed by statistical tests 
(two-tailed t tests at the .05 level were used throughout these results);  
of 12 comparisons between means, only two showed significant differ- 
enees, those two occurring in the "flat" condition for the 85-15 popula- 
tion, where the spherical rule yielded probabil i ty assessments signifi- 
cantly lower than the quadratic or logarithmic rules. The differences 
among characteristic shapes of different types of PSRs do not appear to 
appreciably influence Ss' probabili ty assessments. 
With respect to the effect of manipulating the steepness of the PSRs 
through multiplieative transformations, it was expected that  sharpening 
the SEV function by making the PSI{ steeper would cause a reduction 
in the variabil i ty of Ss' responses, since deviating from the optimal as- 
sessment would be much more costly in terms of SEV under a peaked 
rule. However, as can be Observed in Figure 2, no such systematic reduc- 
tion of variance occurred. Surprisingly, varying "steepness" appeared to 
have an effect on central tendency, but not on variance. The combined 
TABLE 1 
~V[EAN INFERRED PROBABILITY ESTIMATES FOR THE ~-VfORE ]~IKELY HYPOTHESIS 
60-40 Population 85-15 Population 
Scoring 
rule Flat Peaked Flat Peaked 
Logarithmic .77 (. 05)~ .65 .88 (. 02) .75 
Quadratic .76 (. 05) .65 .88 (. 04) .75 
Spherical .75 (. 03) .65 .83 (. 03) .76 
Linear .81 (. 03) .78 .94 (. 04) .90 
Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of the difference between flat and 
peaked conditions. 
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mean inferred probability assessment for flat PSRs was significantly 
greater than the mean assessment for peaked PSRs, both for the 60-40 
and for the 85-15 populations. In the six individual comparisons be- 
tween flat and peaked forms of the same PSR, all but one indicated sig- 
nificant differences. Thus, it is clear that manipulating the multiplicative 
constant in a PSR does affect Ss' inferred probabilities even though not 
in the way expected. 
The additive constant also had an effect on ~qs' responses. There was 
no significant difference between mean assessments for the flat logarith- 
mic rule (./7) and the same rule with 50 points added to each score 
(./3), but the mean assessment for the same rule with 50 points sub- 
tracted from each score was significantly lower than for the other two 
rules. In fact, even though that PSR offered the worst set of bets in 
terms of expected value, it produced a mean probability assessment 
closest to the correct proportions of any of the scoring rules (.61). 
DISCUSSION 
Which scoring rule should one use? If the probabiliW assessor maxi- 
mizes SEV~ it should make no difference. However, as has been demon- 
strated here, people apparently do not carefully evaluate and maximize 
their SEV function. Other factors influence assessments. 
I t  appears to be relatively unimportant which type of PSR one uses, 
at least for the populations tested (with extreme probabilities such as 
between .99 and 1.0 one might well expect the logarithmic rule to pro- 
duce assessments different from the spherical and quadratic rules, since 
the SEV function for the logarithmic rule falls off to -~z  near rT; = 
1.0 and r~ = 0). The characteristic shape of each type of PSR does not 
seem to influence probability assessments to any large extent. 
However, multiplicative transformations of PSRs do have large ef- 
fects on mean probability assessments, although, contrary to expecta- 
tions, they had no reliable effect on the variance of probability assess- 
ments. Making the PSR function steeper seems to make probability 
assessments more cautious, to move them nearer to .50. There are several 
alternative explanations of this phenomenon. One is that the penalties for 
being "wrong" with extreme responses are much more severe with the 
steeper PSRs. A value of rk near 1.0 for the favored event implies a value 
near 0 for the other event. Note in Figure 1 how low all the steep func- 
tions go as rT~ approaches 0. The Ss may have been hesitant about taking 
chances with such large losses. 
However, there are other possible explanations for the effect of the 
multiplicative transform. Both from their answers to the question "What 
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was your strategy?" and from their choices, one can discern that Ss 
sometimes looked for the bet whose two possible outcomes formed a ratio 
close to that of the population proportions. Such a strategy is not in gen- 
eral optimal, but it may be intuitively compelling. 
Nevertheless, that strategy was apparently not employed as often as 
another nonoptimal scheme. The Ss often chose the bet which had the 
smallest positive value attached to the less likely hypothesis, such that 
if that hypothesis was not correct, then they would still lose nothing. 
The Ss often seemed to express a reluctance to take a bet where there 
was a possibility of a loss, so a discontinuity appeared where values 
changed from positive to negative. This last strategy may provide at 
least a partial explanation for the differences between means of the Flat 
vs Peaked conditions. In the Flat condition the bet in each list one 
would choose if using this strategy always corresponded to a higher in- 
ferred probability than the bet from the Peaked list which that strategy 
would lead one to choose. 
To get an idea of the extent to which the last two strategies described 
above were used, observe the distribution of Ss' probability assessments 
in Fig. 2. The arrow pointing up indicates the inferred probability for 
that bet for which the ratio of values best approximated the ratio of the 
population proportions. The arrow pointing down indicates the inferred 
probability for that bet which offered the smallest positive value for the 
less likely hypothesis (given that the value for the more likely hypothesis 
was positive). Where arrows do not appear there was no bet in that list 
which fitted one or the other of the above conditions. It. is interesting to 
note that the list that produced the best assessments did not contain any 
bets one could choose by the above simple strategies. This leads one to 
wonder whether people would be more willing to maximize SEV if alter- 
native strategies were less available or obvious. 
One way of eliminating difficulties encountered in changing from posi- 
tive to negative scores is through additive transformations, so that all 
possible scores are either positive (recall that the log rule requires trun- 
cation) or negative, but not a mixture. In this context it is interesting to 
note that one industry which regularly makes use of PSRs, meteorology, 
uses a form of the quadratic score where all outcomes are negative (the 
"Brier" score) and the optimal strategy is to minimize losses. 
In eonelusion~ these results have rather complex implications about 
which scoring rule should be used for the purpose of motivating better 
probability assessments. The form of the PSR is essentially irrelevant, 
at least over the large range of the probability scale. It is probably a 
good idea to restrict to all positive values or all negative values in order 
to counter the use of some nonoptimal strategies. Finally, the use of 
EFFECTS OF PROPER SCORING RULES 317 
a more peaked PSR seems to lead to more cautious assessments, but it 
is difficult to know in advance whether tha t  is a desirable or undesirable 
quality. 
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